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THE THIN RED FEDERAL POVERTY LINE:
HOW REJECTING THE MEDICAID
EXPANSION AFFECTS THOSE WITH
EXCHANGE COVERAGE
J. ANGELO DESANTIS *

I. INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court struck down the penalty for states
refusing to expand Medicaid, it created a great experiment: States
could opt to run the Affordable Care Act (ACA) without the
Medicaid Expansion. 1 It’s akin to removing a critical component
from an engine, turning the key, and watching what happens.
Given the politics surrounding healthcare reform, some states are
surely choosing to run that experiment hoping the machine
explodes.
To be sure, implementing healthcare reform without the
Medicaid Expansion carries consequences. Five million poor
Americans—who would otherwise be Medicaid eligible—going
without coverage is only the most obvious consequence. 2 But less
obvious consequences will follow. Without the Medicaid
Expansion, running the Exchanges—an ostensibly discrete ACA
component—can have unexpected and harsh consequences.
The Exchanges were created—statute, regulations, and all—
under the assumption that Medicaid would expand. 3 Numerous
Exchange rules work, and make sense, because Medicaid is
* J. Angelo DeSantis is a lecturer and Wydick Fellow at the University of
California, Davis, School of Law. Thanks to The John Marshall Law School
and the editors and staff of THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW REVIEW.
1. See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2607 (2012).
2. Michelle Fay Cortez, Push Against Obamacare Leaves 5 Million Without
Coverage, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 10, 2013, www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-17
/push-against-obamacare-leaves-5-million-without-coverage.html; Sarah Kliff,
Florida rejects Medicaid expansion, leaves 1 million uninsured, WASHINGTON
POST, May 5, 2013 www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/05
/florida-rejects-medicaid-expansion-leaves-1-3-million-uninsured
(Florida
opting out of expansion, alone, left just under one million Floridians out of
Medicaid coverage).
3. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (“It is fair to say that Congress assumed
that every State would participate in the Medicaid expansion”).
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available to all earning below 138% of the federal poverty line. But
without that Expanded Medicaid coverage, Exchange rules can be
harsh, ironic, and even nonsensical.
For example, it has been widely covered that in nonExpansion states, many earning below the poverty line will be too
poor to qualify for subsidies designed to help the poor afford
coverage. 4 Exchange premium tax credit subsidies 5 are limited to
enrollees earning between 100% and 400% of poverty. In an
Expansion state, that makes sense: everyone earning below 138%
of the poverty line is covered by Medicaid. But in non-Expansion
states, this creates a dividing line between those eligible for
affordable coverage and those too poor to be eligible.
Compounding that irony, some of those excluded from
subsidies would be eligible if they were lawfully present aliens—
rather than US citizens. The Act extends Exchange subsidies to
lawfully present aliens earning below the poverty line. 6 Again, in
Expansion states, that disparate treatment makes sense: most
lawfully present aliens are ineligible for Medicaid, thus Congress
extended Exchange subsidies to cover this population. But in nonExpansion states that rule is nonsensical and ironic. This
consequence too has been discussed.
This article explores the less-discussed consequences to
Exchanges in non-Expansion states. One consequence is that the
rules designed to help individuals who fall on hard times maintain
coverage can work against the poor in non-Expansion states. In
those states, common life events, marriage, divorce, a new child, a
job loss, and retirement, can push lower income enrollees out of
subsidy eligibility. And if enrollees report income changes to the
Exchange—as most Exchanges require—they’ll lose their
subsidies. But in non-Expansion states, enrollees may be better off
not notifying Exchanges of certain income drops.
Indeed, in non-Expansion states, enrollees must play a
nonintuitive game of concealing certain information from the
Exchange, while playing a pay-now-collect-later game, to eke out
the subsidies their income entitles them to. These games can work
as a tax on the poor.
Again, all the rules and regulations that require this

4. See, e.g. Deena Winter, I’m too poor for Obamacare and I’m too rich for
Medicaid, NEBRASKA WATCHDOG, Oct. 28, 2013, watchdog.org/113041/im-poorobamacare-im-rich-medicaid/; PBS NEWSHOUR, Private alternative to Medicaid
expansion faces crucial vote in Arkansas, Feb. 17, 2014, www.pbs.org/news
hour/bb/private-alternative-medicaid-expansion-faces-crucial-vote-arkansas;
The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand
Medicaid, KFF (Oct. 23, 2013) http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/thecoverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid.
5. The ACA uses the terms “Premium Tax Credits,” “Advanced Premium
Tax Credits,” or “APTC.” I prefer the simpler term “subsidies.”
6. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18051 (West 2014).
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gameplay in non-Expansion states make perfect sense in states
that expand Medicaid—indeed those rules greatly benefit
enrollees.
Another consequence is the ease with which one’s income may
fall below the poverty line can lead to churning in and out of
coverage. Similarly, employers of low-wage workers could use
subsidy eligibility as leverage over vulnerable employees. A lowincome employee’s eligibility for subsides can turn on an
employer’s willingness to add or cut hours, offer overtime, and give
or withhold bonuses. Some employers may abuse that power.
And non-Expansion states may see other consequences. For
example, having the poverty line as the threshold for subsidies
may encourage applicants to overstate income. Indeed, existing
regulations appear to make it easy to overstate income in order to
qualify for subsidies. Whether this practice will be widespread and
whether the Exchange will crack down on it remain to be seen.
Finally, rejecting the Medicaid Expansion threatens the
Exchanges’ long-term sustainability. Having the poverty line as
the threshold for coverage creates a tipping point for low-income
wage earners. During a financial downturn, an Exchange could
lose many low-income enrollees. This could affect the healthy riskmix of the pool of insureds, driving up costs, and threatening the
long-term survivability of the Exchanges. The lack of Medicaid
may also deprive the Exchanges of a new stream of enrollees.
These consequences are explored in turn, following
background on how an Exchange determines who is eligible for
subsidies and how mid-year income changes are reconciled.

II. BACKGROUND ON EXCHANGE ELIGIBILITY
DETERMINATIONS
A. How Subsidies Make Exchange Coverage Affordable
Under the Act, Exchange subsidies 7 are available to those
earning between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty line. 8
Subsidies are available either as an end-of-year tax credit, or an
advanced payment applied directly to plan premiums. 9

7. Again, the ACA uses the terms “Premium Tax Credits,” “Advanced
Premium Tax Credits,” or “APTC.” I prefer the simpler term “subsidies.”
8. 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West).
9. See id.; Julie Appleby and Kaiser Health News, Will You Qualify for an
Obamacare Subsidy?, PBS NEWSHOUR, Sept. 10, 2013, www.pbs.org
/newshour/rundown/will-you-qualify-for-an-obamacare-subsidy.
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2013 Poverty Guidelines for the 48 Contiguous States
and the District of Columbia 10
Persons in Family/Household
Poverty Guideline
1
$11,490
2
$15,510
3
$19,530
4
$23,550
5
$27,570
6
$31,590
7
$35,610
8
$39,630
For families/households with more than 8 persons, add $4,020
for each additional person.
Subsidies enable eligible enrollees to purchase coverage at a
set percentage of their income: 2% to 9.5%—on a sliding scale. 11
For example, an enrollee earning 150% of the poverty line
($17,235) is expected to contribute 4% or $689.40 or $57.45 a
month towards coverage. 12
Income Contribution for Exchange Plans 13
Income as a Percent
Initial Premium
Final Premium
of Poverty Line
Percentage
Percentage
Up to 133%
2.0%
2.0%
133%–150%
3.0%
4.0%
150%–200%
4.0%
6.3%
200%–250%
6.3%
8.05%
250%–300%
8.05%
9.5%
300%–400%
9.5%
9.5%
But the 4% contribution does not apply to every available
Exchange plan; it applies to the “the benchmark” plan—the
second-lowest-cost-silver level plan. 14 An enrollee earning 150% of
poverty will only pay 4% if he enrolls in the benchmark plan. If he
enrolls in a less expensive plan, he’ll pay less than 4%; if he
chooses a more expensive plan, he’ll pay more.
Precisely how much he pays for a plan turns on his subsidy—
the government’s contribution. That subsidy turns on the cost of
the benchmark plan. The subsidy is the difference between the
10. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2013 Poverty
Guidelines, aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/13poverty.cfm (last visited May 10, 2014).
11. 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West).
12. $17,235 × 4% = $689.40.
13. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012).
14. Id.
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monthly premium and the enrollee’s contribution. For example,
the benchmark plan has a $160 monthly premium. Subtract from
that the enrollee’s 4% of income contribution, $57.45. That results
in a $102.55 government subsidy. The government will contribute
$102.55 to any plan the enrollee selects. Depending on the plan,
the enrollee’s share may be more, less, or exactly 4% of his income.
Some low income enrollees could have a no-cost plan if premiums
are low enough.
Cost-sharing subsidies also keep care affordable for enrollees
earning less than 250% of poverty. 15 For eligible enrollees, costsharing subsidies increase the actuarial value and reduce the outof-pocket limit of Silver level plans, on a sliding scale. 16
Income
100–150% FPL
151–200% FPL
201–250% FPL

Silver Actuarial Value Plus
Subsidy 17
94%
87%
73%

For low-income enrollees, the increased actuarial value, limits
out-of-pocket costs and prevents unexpected financial burdens of
high deductibles, co-pays, or co-insurances.

B. How Federally Run Exchanges Determine Subsidies
Eligibility
Nearly every state that has rejected the Medicaid Expansion
has also opted to have the federal government operate its
Exchange. 18 Thus, federal regulations determine subsidy eligibility
in those states. 19
Under federal regulations and the Act, when an individual or
family applies for coverage, the Exchange determines eligibility. 20
To buy an unsubsidized Exchange plan, applicants provide their
names, addresses, dates of birth, social security numbers, and if
15. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071 (West 2014).
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. See Kaiser Family Foundation, State Decisions on Health Insurance
Marketplaces and the Medicaid Expansion, 2014, kff.org/health-reform/stateindicator/state-decisions-for-creating-health-insurance-exchanges-andexpanding-medicaid/#note-2 (Idaho’s exchange is partially run by the federal
government; New Hampshire’s Exchange is a partnership, but New
Hampshire is well on its way to adopting a private option Medicaid
alternative).
19. Many states running their own Exchanges have also used the federal
regulations as a guide in drafting their own regulations. California’s Exchange
regulations closely parallel federal regulations.
20. 45 C.F.R. § 155.305.
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needed, identifying information with respect to immigration
status. 21 The Exchange then verifies citizenship, incarceration,
and residency status. 22
For subsidy eligibility, additional verification is required. The
Exchange verifies whether the applicant’s expected household
income falls between 100% and 400% of the poverty line. 23 For
this, an applicant provides income and family size information as
well as any change, or expected change, in income. 24 The applicant
must also attest that (1) she will file an income tax return for the
benefit year; (2) if married, she will file a joint return; (3) no
taxpayer can claim her as a dependent; and (4) she will claim a
personal exemption deduction for anyone listed on the application
as a dependent. 25
The Exchange then requests information from the IRS and
Social Security Administration, including the taxpayer’s (i)
taxpayer identity information, (ii) filing status, (iii) allowed
number of individuals for deduction and (iv) modified adjusted
gross income. 26 The Exchange can also access wage information
from employers through Equifax. 27
The Exchange verifies household size by accepting the
applicant’s attestation without further verification. 28 But if the
Exchange finds the attestation is not reasonably compatible with
other information provided by the applicant or in the records
obtained by the Exchange, the Exchange must verify the
attestation. 29
The Exchange verifies income by comparing the applicant’s
projected income with IRS and Social Security Administration
data. 30 If that data confirms the applicant’s attestation, the
Exchange determines eligibility based on that projected income. 31

21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18081 (West).
22. 45 C.F.R. § 155.305.
23. Id.
24. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18081 (West); 42 U.S.C.A. § 18082. See Application for
Health Coverage & Help Paying Costs, Health Insurance Marketplace,
marketplace.cms.gov/getofficialresources/publications-and-articles/marketplace
-application-for-family.pdf (last visited May 10, 2014).
25. 45 C.F.R. § 155.310.
26. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103 (West); 45 C.F.R. § 155.320; Center for Consumer
Information & Insurance Oversight, Frequently Asked Questions on Health
Insurance Marketplaces and Income Verification, Aug. 5, 2013, www.cms
.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/Downloads/income-verification8-5-2013.pdf.
27. Id.
28. 45 C.F.R. § 155.320.
29. Id.
30. Frequently Asked Questions on Health Insurance Marketplaces and
Income Verification, supra note 26.
31. 45 C.F.R. § 155.320.
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C. The Exchange Verifies Projected Income Increases
and Decreases Through Enrollee Attestations and IRS
Data
Verification may become more complicated if the applicant
attests that the IRA and Social Security data does not represent
his projected income. If an applicant attests that his income has
increased, or “is reasonably expected to increase,” the Exchange
“must accept the applicant’s attestation regarding a tax filer’s
annual household income without further verification.” 32 But if the
applicant attests that his income has decreased, the Exchange
must verify significant income drops. 33 If the data available to the
Exchange shows that the applicant’s income will likely be in
excess by “a significant amount” of the applicant’s attestation, the
Exchange must attempt to resolve the inconsistency. 34 The
Exchange will contact the applicant to confirm the information. 35
If that does not resolve the inconsistency, the Exchange must
notify the applicant and provide the applicant 90 days to present
“satisfactory documentary evidence.” 36 The Exchange can extend
the 90 days if the applicant demonstrates a good faith effort to
obtain the documentation. 37
During that time, the Exchange continues with all other

32. 45 C.F.R. § 155.320(c)(iii) (provided the applicant’s attested income
would not place the applicant in Medicaid or CHIP); 78 FR 42160-01 (we note
that, under § 155.320(c)(3)(iii), an attestation that reflects an increase
compared to the tax data would generally be accepted without further
verification (for purposes of eligibility for advance payments of the premium
tax credit and cost-sharing reductions); therefore, if an applicant attests to a
projected annual household income that would qualify him or her for advance
payments of the premium tax credit or cost-sharing reductions but MAGIbased income sources indicate that income is lower than the applicant’s
attestation, even if such data indicates Medicaid or CHIP eligibility, the
attestation would be accepted without further verification.). Contra Frequently
Asked Questions on Health Insurance Marketplaces and Income Verification,
supra note 26. (“Marketplaces will always use data from tax filings and Social
Security data to verify household income information provided on an
application, and in many cases, will also use current wage information that is
available electronically. . . . If the data submitted as part of the application
cannot be verified using IRS and SSA data, then the information is compared
with wage information from employers provided by Equifax. If Equifax data
does not substantiate the inputted information, the Marketplace will request
an explanation or additional documentation to substantiate the applicant’s
household income. . . . If documentation is requested and is not provided
within the specified timeframe, regulations specify that the Marketplace will
base its eligibility determination on IRS and SSA data, unless IRS data is
unavailable, in which case the Marketplace will discontinue any advance
payments of the premium tax credit and cost-sharing reductions.”)
33. 45 C.F.R. § 155.320.
34. Id.; § 155.315.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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enrollment eligibility determinations. 38 And the applicant will
receive Exchange subsidies, provided she attests that she
understands that the subsidies are subject to reconciliation. 39
If the Exchange cannot verify the attestation after 90 days (or
more), the Exchange must determine eligibility based on the
available information. 40 An exception can be made, if the applicant
does not have documentation to resolve the inconsistency because
the documentation does not exist or is not reasonably available. 41
The Exchange “must” then provide an exception, on a case-by-case
basis, and accept an applicant’s attestation along with an
explanation of circumstances as to why the applicant does not
have documentation. 42
One instance where an expected income decrease may be
difficult to verify is if an employee leaves his job to start his own
business. 43 Becoming self-employed may initially result in a sharp
drop in income, and it may be difficult to project income at the
outset. Thus, the Exchange may need to grant an extension and
give the applicant time to run his own business and provide
income verification as it becomes available, and perhaps grant a
case-by-case exception.
The fact that income decreases must be verified, while income
increases need not, makes sense in states that have expanded
Medicaid. In those states, overstating income carries no risk to the
state. Initially, it can only reduce or eliminate subsidies. If the
enrollee turns out to be entitled to a greater subsidy, the
government reimburses the enrollee through a tax refund—
effectively getting an interest-free loan. And the government may
save money if the income overstatement avoids cost sharing
reductions because cost sharing reductions are not reimbursable
through reconciliation. 44
But projected income decreases should be verified because
they can qualify an individual for larger subsidies, costing the
government more upfront. And the government’s ability to recover
those subsidies—if it turns out the enrollee was not entitled to the
subsidies—may be limited. Thus, it makes sense that the
government verify an applicant’s attestation that his income will
fall.
Nevertheless, the fact that projected income decreases must
be verified, while projected increases need not, may have
significant consequences in non-Expansion state.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Angelo DeSantis, Hanging your own shingle in the age of health
exchanges, THE DAILY JOURNAL, Jan 2, 2014.
44. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B–4.
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D. Subsidy Eligibility Can Be Redetermined During a
Benefit Year
If the Exchange receives and verifies new information from an
enrollee, or identifies updated information through data matching,
the Exchange must redetermine the enrollee’s subsidy eligibility. 45
Enrollees must report changes to information on their
application. 46 The Exchange may establish a reasonable threshold
for changes in income, so that not all income changes need be
reported. 47 For example, California does not require notification if
the income change “does not impact” the amount of the subsidies
or the cost sharing reduction. 48 But the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services guidance to the federal Exchanges do not
provide a threshold for changes. 49 All application information
changes must be reported within 30 days, or the enrollee “could
have potential liability to repay some or all of the APTC received
during the year.” 50 The insurance application itself states: “I know
that I must tell the Health Insurance Marketplace if anything
changes (and is different than) what I wrote on this application. …
I understand that a change in my information could affect my
eligibility.” 51
The Exchange verifies reported changes using available IRS
data. Once the data is verified, the Exchange redetermines the
enrollee’s eligibility, and notifies the enrollee and the enrollee’s
employer. 52
The Exchange also periodically examines its data sources to
look for changes such as death and eligibility for other plans,
including Medicare or Medicaid. 53 The Exchange has the option to
attempt to identify changes that may affect eligibility in the
Exchange plan or eligibility in insurance affordability programs. 54
If the Exchange identifies updated income, family size, or
family composition information, the Exchange will notify the
enrollee and give the enrollee 30 days to notify the Exchange that
the data is inaccurate. 55 If the enrollee confirms the information,

45. 45 C.F.R. § 155.330.
46. Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight, Federally
Facilitated Marketplace Enrollment Operational Policy &Guidance, Oct. 3,
2013,
www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads
/ENR_OperationsPolicyandGuidance_5CR_100313.pdf.
47. 45 C.F.R. § 155.330.
48. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 10, § 6496.
49. Federally Facilitated Marketplace Enrollment Operational Policy &
Guidance, supra note 46, at 27.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 45 C.F.R. § 155.330.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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the Exchange redetermines the enrollee’s eligibility. 56 If the
enrollee provides new information, the Exchange will attempt to
verify that information. 57 But if the enrollee fails to respond, the
Exchange will maintain the enrollee’s existing eligibility
determination, without considering the new information. 58
This may provide a loophole in non-Expansion states.

E. Subsidies Are Reconciled at the Year’s End Through
the Enrollee’s Tax Returns
Enrollees receive Exchange subsidies based on projected
income. But the subsidies an enrollee is ultimately entitled to turn
on actual income for the plan year. 59 Thus, when an enrollee files
her return, the IRS reconciles the subsidies she received with the
subsidies she is actually entitled to. An enrollee may end up owing
a tax equal to some, or all, of the subsidies she received. But two
safe harbors can limit or eliminate those taxes.
For those earning less than 400% of the poverty line, the Act
caps the amount owed though reconciliation. 60 Individuals earning
between 300 and 400% of poverty can owe a maximum of $1,250
(adjusted by the consumer price index); those earning between
200% and 300% of poverty can owe $750, and those earning less
than 200% of poverty can owe $300. 61 For married couples, the
caps are $2,500, $1,500, and $600 respectively. 62 Cost sharing
reductions, however, are not subject to reconciliation. 63
Those who received subsidies but whose end-of-year income
unexpectedly falls below the poverty line will owe no taxes. 64 The
enrollee remains eligible for subsidies if (1) he enrolled in an
Exchange plan; (2) when he enrolled, the Exchange projected his
income to be between 100 and 400% of poverty, for the plan year;
(3) the Exchange authorized and paid the advanced subsidies for
at least one month; and (4) he would have been eligible if his
income was between 100 and 400% of poverty for his family size. 65
For individuals falling within the safe harbor, subsidies are
calculated based on actual income. 66 And their expected
contribution towards a Silver plan is reduced to 2% of income.
The safe harbor provisions ensure that a significant,

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B.
60. 26 C.F.R. 1.36B-4.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B.
64. 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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unexpected income drop will not trigger an unexpected tax
consequence. But the safe harbor provisions may not protect an
individual who reports his income decrease to the Exchange from
losing his subsidy mid-year.

III.THE CHALLENGES OF MID-PLAN INCOME DROPS IN
NON-EXPANSION STATES
One problem of enrolling in an Exchange plan in a nonExpansion state revolves around a mid-year income drop. Consider
this scenario: Harry is single and typically earns $22,980 a year—
200% of poverty. He enrolls in an Exchange plan and receives
advanced subsidies according to his projected income of 200% of
poverty (evidenced by prior tax returns). At his income, he’ll
contribute 6.3% of income towards a benchmark plan. If he enrolls
in a benchmark plan 67 with unsubsidized premiums of $327 a
month, he will contribute $120.65 a month towards that plan. 68
For comparison, if Harry’s projected income was between 100
and 133% of poverty he would contribute only 2%, or roughly $20 a
month, towards coverage. If his income was 400% of poverty, he
would contribute $363.85 a month. 69
Early in the year, Harry loses his job, with no prospects of
finding new employment (perhaps he got sick). Harry’s projected
yearly income is now well below the poverty line.
Under his plan, Harry is almost certainly required to report
this income change to the Exchange. 70 But if he does, the
Exchange will redetermine his subsidies down to zero. The
Exchange must redetermine subsidy eligibility when it receives
new information. 71 And with his income now projected to be less
than the poverty line, subsidies are not authorized under the
Act. 72 Though he’ll still be enrolled in his plan.
In a Medicaid Expansion state, this makes sense: if a lowincome enrollee loses his job and has no prospects of finding new
employment, the prudent move is to terminate Exchange subsidies
and enroll the individual in a no-cost Medicaid plan. Indeed,
Medicaid eligibility is based on monthly—not yearly—income
precisely so someone can quickly switch to Medicaid when hard

67. Given that he earns 200%, buying a benchmark plan, or at least a
silver level plan is a good idea because he is eligible for cost sharing subsidies
and cost sharing subsidies only apply to silver level plans.
68. $22,980 (Harry’s annual income, exactly 200% FPL) × 6.3% = $1,447.74
or $120.65 a month.
69. $45,960 × 9.5% = $4,366.20 or $263.85 a month.
70. Federally Facilitated Marketplace Enrollment Operational Policy &
Guidance, supra note 46.
71. 45 C.F.R. § 155.330.
72. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B–2.
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times hit. 73 But in a non-Expansion state, where the enrollee is
likely ineligible for Medicaid, terminating subsidies after a job loss
is a harsh consequence. And no regulation suggests that an
Exchange in a non-Expansion state has discretion to act
differently. 74
But Harry can avoid losing his subsidy by not reporting his
income change to the Exchange. Although Harry is required to
report his income changes, the consequences of failing to do so are
not severe. Harry may owe taxes through reconciliation for
subsidies received that he was not entitled to. 75 But taxes owed
through reconciliation are capped for those earning up to 400% of
poverty. 76 And those who end up earning less than the poverty
level (and so are ineligible for subsidies) are treated as eligible and
thus will owe no taxes for lack of eligibility. 77
By not reporting his job loss to the Exchange, Harry will
continue to receive subsidies for his projected income of 200% of
poverty. And he will not face an end-of-year tax liability for the
subsidies he receives, if he ends the year earning less than the
poverty line.
Still, the Exchange may periodically review Harry’s income
through payroll taxes, and it may discover his job loss. 78 But this
may not lead to termination of subsidies. If the Exchange learns of
an income change, it will notify Harry of the discrepancy and
request that Harry verify the change. 79 But if Harry fails to verify
the income change, the Exchange must continue the subsidies at
the original level. 80 Thus, Harry can keep his subsidies if he plays
the game right.

73. See John A. Graves, Better Methods Will Be Needed to Project Incomes
to Estimate Eligibility for Subsidies in Health Insurance Exchanges, HEALTH
AFFAIRS (2012).
74. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.330 (The Exchange must redetermine the eligibility
of an enrollee in a Qualified Health Plan through the Exchange during the
benefit year if it receives and verifies new information reported by an enrollee
or identifies updated information through the data matching described in
paragraph (d) of this section).
75. Federally Facilitated Marketplace Enrollment Operational Policy &
Guidance, supra note 46, at 27.
76. 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-4.
77. 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2.
78. 45 C.F.R. § 155.330 (The Exchange must periodically examine
available data . . . to identify the following changes: (i) Death; and (ii) . . .
eligibility determinations for Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, or the BHP [Basic
Health Program], if a BHP is operating in the service area of the Exchange . . .
The Exchange may make additional efforts to identify and act on changes that
may affect an enrollee’s eligibility for enrollment in a QHP [Qualified Health
Plan] through the Exchange or for insurance affordability programs”).
79. 45 C.F.R. § 155.330.
80. Id. (“If the enrollee does not respond within the 30-day period . . .
maintain the enrollee’s existing eligibility determination without considering
the updated information”).
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The rub is that Harry will continue to pay 6.4% of his income
($120) for coverage, even after losing his job. By comparison,
enrollees earning substantially more than Harry (between 100 and
133% of poverty) will pay only 2% of their income toward coverage
($20 a month versus $120). The situation would be even worse if
Harry’s subsidies were tied to a projected income of 400% of
poverty.
Still, Harry can eventually collect additional subsidies if he
surmounts a fairly large hurdle. If Harry can continue to pay the
$120 a month for the rest of the plan year, he will be refunded the
4.4% difference between the 6.4% he’s paying and the 2% he
should have paid. Through end-of-year reconciliation, his premium
subsidies will be recalculated for his sub-poverty income, and
Harry could reap a tax credit of about $1,200: 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2
provides not only a safe harbor, it specifies that the enrollee’s
actual income is used to compute the subsidies. 81
But that is only if Harry can continue paying the 6.4% of
income after losing his job. If he can’t, he’ll suffer a double loss.
He’ll go uninsured, and he’ll receive a reconciliation tax credit only
for the months he paid premiums.
Thus non-Expansion states effectively tax those who lose
their jobs and do not have the wherewithal to continue to pay
premiums. And these states effectively tax those who do not
thoroughly understand the ACA system and fail to determine that
they are better off not reporting job losses to the Exchange. NonExpansion states paradoxically punish enrollees who do what
they’re supposed to do: report an income change to the Exchange.

A. Significant Life Events Can Make Enrollees
Ineligible for Affordable Care in Non-Expansion States
Harry’s scenario also illustrates how significant life events
can render an enrollee ineligible for affordable coverage in nonExpansion states. Marriage, divorce, a new child, a job loss,
retirement, and even the annual increase in the federal poverty
line can affect income as a percentage of the poverty line. 82
For example, if Louise is single and earns $15,000 83 a year
(131% of poverty), she’s eligible for subsidized Exchange coverage.
81. 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B–2 (“If a taxpayer is treated as an applicable taxpayer
[because his income was below 100% of poverty] under paragraph (b)(5) or
(b)(6) of this section, the taxpayer’s actual household income for the taxable
year is used to compute the premium assistance amounts.”).
82. The federal poverty line for an individual was $11,490 in 2013; it is
$11,670 in 2014. Internal Revenue Service, Questions and Answers on the
Premium Tax Credit, Feb. 3, 2014, www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Questions-andAnswers-on-the-Premium-Tax-Credit.
83. For comparison, someone earning the federal minimum wage of $7.25,
working 40 hours a week, for 50 weeks would earn $14,500 before taxes.
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But if she marries Johnathan who has no income, their combined
$15,000 income will be below the $15,510 poverty line for a family
of two, leaving them both ineligible.
Conversely, if Louise and Johnathan are single and each earn
$10,000 (87% of the poverty line), they are each ineligible for
subsidies. But if they marry, their combined income of $20,000 is
129% of the federal poverty line for a household of two, making
them eligible for subsidies. If they later divorce, they will again be
ineligible. Thus, in non-Expansion states, certain circumstances
can incentivize or disincentivize marrage or divorce. 84
Similarly, having or adopting a child will drop a household’s
income as a percentage of the poverty line by raising the poverty
line by $4,020. 85 Unlike a job loss, a new child must be reported to
the Exchange to enroll the child in the plan. That triggers an
eligibility redetermination. But if a child makes a family ineligible
for affordable coverage, at least the child will be covered by CHIP
(and possibly the parents by Medicaid depending on the state and
their income), but others may be excluded. Thus, subsidy
eligibility may influence decisions to have children or to
discontinue pregnancies.
Another consequence is the impact these rules will have on
entrepreneurship in non-Expansion states. Presumably, in Harry’s
scenario he was laid off. But what if Harry left his job to start a
new business? Exchange coverage is generally a boon to the selfemployed, as it gives them access to high quality, community
rated, guaranteed issue coverage. But in non-Expansion states,
the fact that becoming self-employed often entails a sharp income
drop may deter entrepreneurship. 86
Thus, in Expansion states, the decision to marry, divorce,
change jobs, or have a child are in and of themselves major
decisions, but in non-Expansion states they take on an extra
dimension in that they can lead to harsh coverage consequences.

84. See also David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax
Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent
Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669,
705 (2012) (arguing that, in all states, employer-sponsored health insurance
can in some instances penalize marriage, incentivizing divorce. This is because
“affordable coverage” turns on the cost of individual coverage, not family
coverage).
85. See U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2013 Poverty
Guidelines, aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/13poverty.cfm
86. See Shaila Dewan, How Obamacare Could Unlock Job Opportunities,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2014, available at www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23
/magazine/how-obamacare-could-unlock-job-opportunities.html.

2014]

The Thin Red Poverty Line

937

B. Non-Expansion States May See an Exacerbated
Form of Churn
In non-Expansion states, losing coverage due to life events
can also exacerbate the consequences of churn. Churn is the term
given to enrollees frequently shifting back-and-forth into coverage
eligibility due to eligibility status changes. 87 Even for states
expanding Medicaid, churn is a problem. Enrollees losing
eligibility may switch between plans with different benefits and
providers—perhaps on a monthly basis. This can frustrate
enrollees and hinder continuity of care.
But for non-Expansion states, churn’s consequences are
worse. Churning out of subsidized coverage does not entail a loss
of continuity of care; it entails a loss of coverage. 88 And while the
enrollee can still buy unsubsidized coverage, that is difficult for
someone earning below poverty income.
Still, churn may occur less frequently in non-Expansion
states. In Expansion states, churn occurs both when an enrollee’s
income increase places him outside of Medicaid eligibility, and
when an income decrease places him outside of subsidy eligibility.
By contrast, in non-Expansion states, churn will primarily occur
when an enrollee loses Exchange subsidy eligibility. And because
Exchange eligibility turns on yearly income, rather than monthly
income (Medicaid), churn may be less prevalent—but more
consequential.

C. Employers Potentially Wield a Big Stick Over LowIncome Employees
In non-Expansion states, employers of low-wage workers
could use subsidy eligibility as leverage over vulnerable
employees. Benefits are a major component of job lock. Benefits
make it more difficult for employees to leave a job: while
employees can replace income with another job, they might not be
able to find comparable health benefits. Benefits are a tax-free
way for the employer to keep an employee. And from the
employee’s perspective, there is a quid-pro-quo. Indeed, generous
salary and benefits are often called “golden handcuffs.”
87. Churn occurs because those at the margin between Medicaid eligibility
and Exchange subsidy eligibility experience significant income fluctuation.
Indeed, 35% of adults with income below 200% of the poverty line will
experience an income change affecting their Medicaid eligibility within six
months; 50% will experience a change within a year. DHMH, et al., Analysis of
the Basic Health Program (Jan. 17, 2012) at 9, available at dhmh.maryland
.gov/docs/BHP%2001%2018%2012%20Report%20Analysis%20FINAL.pdf. And
24% will churn at least twice within a year; 39% will churn twice in two years;
and in all, 38% will churn at least four times in as many years. Id.
88. Unless the enrollee qualified for Medicaid under the states nonExpanded Medicaid program.
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But in non-Expansion states, low income employees may see
something akin to “lead handcuffs.” An employee’s Exchange
subsidies can turn on how much the employer pays the employee.
The pay is a function of hourly salary, available work hours,
overtime, and bonuses. Employers who pay hourly wages often
reward good workers with more hours and overtime. In nonExpansion states, employers have a new tool to reward or punish
employees. 89
And employers will know which employees are receiving
subsidized coverage. The Exchange notifies employers when an
employee is determined eligible for advance payments of the
premium tax credit or cost-sharing reductions.” The notice
identifies the employee. 90 Whether some employers will abuse this
information remains to be seen.

D. Still, the Unexpected Tax Consequences Could Have
Been Worse in Non-Expansion States
But things could be worse in non-Expansion states. Without
26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2, a mid-year income drop might trigger a
substantial tax burden. If, by the end of the year, an enrollee has
earned less than the poverty line, the enrollee is technically
ineligible for the subsidies. Subsidies are determined by actual,
rather than projected, income (though advanced subsidies are
provided based on projected income). 91 Thus, under the letter of
the law, that enrollee should be obligated to repay the subsidies he
received over the plan year.
Fortunately, Rule 1.36B-2 protects individuals who
inadvertently end the year earning less than the poverty line. 92 So
long as the Exchange determines that the enrollee was eligible for
the subsidies at the beginning of the plan year, the enrollee will be
treated as eligible for the advanced subsidies he received. 93

89. Indeed, there is already concern, and some evidence that employers are
moving low- and moderate-income workers to part-time status is probably
among the most promising strategies employers might use to reorganize their
business operations so as to avoid the employer-mandate penalties and the
nondiscrimination rules. See Gamage, supra note 84, at 711.
90. 45 C.F.R. § 155.310.
91. 26 U.S.C. § 36B.
92. However—and this is not limited to non-Expansion states—there is a
possibility of unexpected liability for those who unexpectedly cross 400% of
poverty. 77 FR 30377 (“An enrollee who unexpectedly finishes the year
earning over 400% of poverty must pay back all advanced subsidies, even if
the enrollee dutifully reported all changes in income to the Exchange.
Moreover, the reconciliation tax caps do not apply to individuals earning over
400%, so there would be no discount. Still, the IRS will consider possible
avenues of administrative relief in appropriate cases for taxpayers who have
additional tax liability as a result of excess advance payments.”)
93. 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2.
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Rule 1.36B-2 makes sense in both Expansion and nonExpansion states. In an Expansion state, an enrollee could
inadvertently finish the year below the poverty line due to a layoff
or reduction in work hours. Further, an enrollee may not wish to
switch to Medicaid during a month of fewer work hours or less
overtime, on the off-chance he will finish the year earning under
the poverty line. Switching to Medicaid could entail changing
providers and benefits—a hassle and disruption to continuity of
care. 94
In non-Expansion states, where switching to Medicaid is not
an option for most individuals, this rule could provide a lifeline.
Individuals eligible for advanced subsidies can generally keep
those subsidies for the plan year—provided the Exchange does not
undertake a mid-year redetermination of the subsidies. Officials
stress, however, that Rule 1.36B-2 is not meant to be a backdoor
for coverage in non-Expansion states.
Still, Rule 1.36B-2 illustrates that regulations can mitigate
some harsh consequences of running an Exchange without the
Medicaid Expansion. Conceivably, new regulations could help
individuals earning close to the poverty line receive advanced
subsidies in non-Expansion states.

IV. CROSSING THE POVERTY LINE TO FIND COVERAGE
In non-Expansion states, those earning below the poverty line
have a big incentive to overstate income. This raises issues of
income verification, enforcement of perjury rules, and whether
low-income applicants can accurately project their income given
the unpredictability of many low-wage jobs.
By contrast, in Expansion states, overstating income is a nonissue: applicants who earn below 138% of poverty enroll in
Medicaid; those who do not enroll in Exchange coverage. Thus,
federal regulations do not appear to require (or even allow) an
Exchange to verify an applicant’s attestation to an income
increase—applicants do, however, sign their applications under
penalty of perjury. 95 But overstating income matters in non-

94. See John A. Graves, Ph.D., Rick Curtis, M.P.P., & Jonathan Gruber,
Ph.D., Balancing Coverage Affordability and Continuity under a Basic Health
Program Option, e44(1) (“Avoiding disruptions in coverage is an important
goal because it can reduce unnecessary administrative costs and improve
health plans’ incentives to invest in achieving longer-term health outcomes.
Continuity of coverage can also help maintain clinician–patient relationships,
especially in places where there are substantial differences between the
clinicians participating in Medicaid and those participating only in private
plans.”)
95. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.320(c)(iii);Application for Health Coverage & Help
Paying Costs, Health Insurance Marketplace, marketplace.cms.gov/getoffi
cialresources/publications-and-articles/marketplace-application-for-family.pdf.
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Expansion states, particularly when rule 1.36B-2 lets an
applicant, approved for advanced subsidies, keep those subsidies
for the plan year (for the most part).
Tax strategies might boost income above 100% of the poverty
line. Indeed, tax experts are advising enrollees earning just over
400% of poverty on ways to reduce their income to qualify for
subsidies. 96 For example, a household of two might obtain a tax
subsidy of $1,207 per month if they can reduce their modified
adjusted gross income to below $62,040 (400% of poverty).97
Income can be reduced through a tax-deductible contribution to an
individual retirement account, 401(k) or other workplace plan (and
IRA contributions can be made until April 15 of the following
year). 98 Deductions that appear above the Adjusted Gross Income
line, such as student loan interest and tuition and fees, can also
reduce income. 99 And simply working fewer hours can bring
income below 400%. 100
Near the poverty line, different strategies might boost income
above 100% of the poverty level. Individuals at the margin could
negotiate with an employer to work more hours. Applicants could
find a second job or even start a business to boost income above
the poverty line prior to applying for coverage. At the extreme end,
a strategic marriage or divorce could boost some applicants above
the poverty line. 101
But just how accurately can low-income applicants forecast
their income? Professor Timothy Jost argues that: “verification in
advance of how much lower-income American families will earn
over a year is a fantasy. Lower-income Americans often work in
part-time, intermittent, or seasonal jobs and are paid hourly
wages, making predicting income exactly a year in advance simply
not possible...A good-faith estimate of income is all that is
possible. Congress cannot reasonably require the impossible.” 102
Income from tips or commission could also be difficult to project. 103

96. Kathleen Pender, Lower 2014 income can net huge health care subsidy,
S.F. Chronicle, Oct. 12, 2013, available at www.sfgate.com/business/networth
/article/Lower-2014-income-can-net-huge-health-care-subsidy-4891087.php.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (“But itemized deductions, including charitable contributions,
mortgage interest, and state income taxes, do not.”).
100. Id.
101. See discussion in section (II)(A.) Significant life events may cause
certain individuals to become ineligible for affordable care.
102. Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: The State Of The
Exchanges, Income Verification, And More, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Oct. 16, 2013,
healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/10/16/implementing-health-reform-the-state-ofthe-exchanges-income-verification-and-more.
103. A rejoinder might be that the applicant can simply wait to get those
subsidies at the end of the year through reconciliation. But that assumes the
applicant can afford to buy unsubsidized coverage for the year.
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The difficulty in predicting matters because attestations are
made under the penalty of perjury. 104 The Act also imposes
additional penalties when an individual fails to provide correct
information based on negligence or disregard of program rules, or
knowingly and willfully provides false or fraudulent
information. 105
But what counts as negligence in projecting future income? Is
it enough that a boss mentions there will be more work next year?
What about an employee’s feeling that the boss likes him and will
give him a raise? Or a feeling that customers will be plentiful and
tips more generous next year? What if the applicant has a plan to
start a new business the next year, or to apply for a higher paying
job? What about a feeling that next year, he will win the lotto?
If accurately forecasting income is impossible for some
applicants, how can the government distinguish good faith
estimates from fraud? And if the government believes applicants
are overstating income, will it pursue perjury charges—
particularly when the federal government is invested in expanding
coverage? 106 Indeed, if the federal government had its way, this
population would be covered by the Medicaid Expansion—and the
government would be paying that cost (at least initially).
Prosecuting murky allegations of perjury in coverage applications
can only discourage Exchange enrollment. And opponents would
likely make political hay of it: “Under ObamaCare, make a
mistake on your application, and you’ll go to jail!” 107
Still federal officials would also like to avoid the appearance
104. Frequently Asked Questions on Health Insurance Marketplaces and
Income Verification, supra note 26.
105. Id.; Jost, supra note 102 (Timothy Jost adds: “Of course, our entire tax
system is in large part an ‘honor system,’ resulting in a ‘tax gap’ last estimated
in 2006 at $385 billion. Of this, an estimated $122 billion was attributable to
business income and $67 billion to corporate income taxes, and $57 billion to
self-employment taxes. It is quite possible that some individuals will receive
premium tax credits to which they are not legally entitled. The CBO
estimates the entire cost of exchange subsidies for 2014 will be $26 billion,
growing to $87 billion in 2016. If we are genuinely concerned about tax fraud,
it would seem there are bigger targets we could be aiming at.”)
106. And will employees of Exchanges in non-Expansion states offer
“nudge-nudge wink-wink” advice for estimating income on insurance
applications?
107. A similar issue is occurring with respect to enrolling Latinos. “The
biggest problem is that a lot of people, new immigrants to this country, have a
mistrust of government, particularly when they see families being divided and
deported.” In October, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a division
of the Department of Homeland Security, said in a memo that it “does not use
information about such individuals or members of their household that is
obtained for purposes of determining eligibility for such coverage as the basis
for pursuing civil immigration enforcement action.” Alison Vekshin, Lag in
Enrolling Latinos in Obamacare Spurs New California Push, BLOOMBERG,
Feb. 13, 2014, www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-14/lag-in-enrolling-latinosin-obamacare-spurs-new-california-push.html.
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of rampant fraud at the Exchanges. It will be interesting to see
whether income overstating occurs and how the government
responds.

V. HOW REJECTING MEDICAID COULD AFFECT THE LONGTERM SUSTAINABILITY OF EXCHANGES
The final consequences considered are to the Exchanges
themselves. Will the absence of Medicaid hurt the long-term
prospects of the Exchanges?

A. Does the Medicaid Expansion Help or Hinder
Exchange Enrollment?
In non-Expansion states, most individuals earning between
100% and 138% of the poverty line are ineligible for Medicaid, but
still eligible for Exchange subsidies. Thus in those states,
Exchange issuers can access a population that would otherwise
enroll in Medicaid plans. Those earning between 100% and 138%
of poverty, are disproportionately younger and thus healthier. 108
Enrolling that population could increase the pool of insureds and
improve the risk-mix ratio—keeping policies affordable and
improving the Exchange’s long-term prospects. Thus, states
rejecting Expansion, might see a healthier exchange.
But it probably won’t be that simple. Medicaid enrollment
may increase Exchange enrollment. Conversely, hindering
Medicaid enrollment may hinder Exchange enrollment. If you’re
uninsured and you notice friends sign up for coverage, you might
be encouraged to explore your own coverage options. As Medicaid
enrollment grows, it may bring more people out of the woodwork to
sign up for coverage: either through Medicaid or the Exchanges. 109
Also, access to Medicaid may help enrollees earn out of
Medicaid and transition to Exchange plans. A widely cited Oregon
study found that Medicaid enrollees’ physical health, including

108. See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid’s Next Fifty Years: Aligning an Old
Program with the New Normal, 6 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 329, 334
(2013) (“The estimated 56 million low income adults and 35 million children
who will experience post-reform churn across the Medicaid and Exchange
markets [because they earn near 138% of the poverty line] represent the
healthiest risk groups across the two markets. Unlike the millions of older and
sicker adults who gain enormous benefits from health reform, this group is in
the workforce and in relatively good health.”)
109. Indeed, even non-Expansion states are seeing a surge in Medicaid
enrollment. All the attention devoted to the ObamaCare launch spurred many
already-eligible people to enroll. Sarah Kliff, Trying to count Obamacare’s
Medicaid enrollment? Good luck, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 23, 2014, www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/23/trying-to-count-obamacare
s-medicaid-enrollment-good-luck.
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conditions such as obesity and diabetes, did not change much (at
least at the outset), but mental health improved dramatically. 110
Better mental health may improve job prospects. And having
coverage in general will avoid catastrophic medical costs, which
can lead to bankruptcy. Thus, Medicaid may serve as a feeder for
the Exchanges, boosting enrollment.
But non-Expansion states forego that enrollment driver. Even
though non-Expansion state Exchanges will have access to a
larger population (those earning between 100 and 138% of
poverty), the lack of an expanded Medicaid program may
ultimately hinder Exchange enrollment.

B. Non-Expansion States Are Susceptible to an
Economic Tipping Point
Further, without the Medicaid option for many low-income
individuals, the Exchanges in those states may see a tipping point
during the next economic downturn.
Individual and family income at the margin of Exchange
subsidy eligibility is particularly susceptible to the effects of
economic downturns. In recessions, hourly wage earners see their
work hours cut. Hourly wage earners—disproportionately low
income—are also particularly vulnerable to layoffs during
downturns.
Thus, in non-Expansion states, a recession could push many
at the margin out of subsidy eligibility. This drop in subsidies—
and almost certain drop in enrollment—threatens the health of the
Exchange. It reduces the pool of insureds, which can increase
premiums. That can lead to adverse selection: those most in need
of coverage (and likely needing the most expensive care) keep their
plans, while those able to forego coverage (and likely needing the
least expensive care) leave, further driving up premiums.
Moreover, Exchange enrollees near the poverty line may
represent a disproportionate share of the young and healthy. Their
loss will affect the healthy risk-mix ratio of the pool of insureds,
driving up premiums.
The drop of insureds during a downturn may also strain care
providers by increasing uncompensated care. Providers will pass
the costs on to insurers, further driving up premiums. And those
losing coverage also lose access to programs designed to reduce the
cost of care, such as free preventative care. This can increase
future costs, further increasing premiums.

110. Sabrina Tavernise, Law’s Expanded Medicaid Coverage Brings a Surge
in Sign-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2014, available at www.nytimes.com/2014/01
/21/health/peace-of-mind-is-first-benefit-for-many-now-getting-medicaid.html;
Sarah L. Taubman et al., Medicaid Increases Emergency-Department Use:
Evidence from Oregon's Health Insurance Experiment, SCIENCE 343, 263 (2014).
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But Expansion states will not likely see the same problems
during a recession. There, low-income enrollees can shift to
Medicaid plans. In some instances, the Exchange issuers also
provide the Medicaid plans (thus the issuers may not lose a
customer). Enrollees will also continue to receive preventative care
through Medicaid and will not be forced to use the Emergency
Room to obtain primary care. Finally, the economy will likely
avoid the double impact of individual bankruptcies resulting from
catastrophic medical care costs.
Thus, Medicaid augments the Exchange making it more
robust and less vulnerable to shocks from a financial crisis.

VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO REDUCE
THESE CONSEQUENCES IN NON-EXPANSION STATES?
Despite these problems, non-Expansion states are still better
off having an Exchange than not. The option to buy communityrated, guaranteed-issue, comprehensive coverage is an enormous
improvement over the status quo pre-healthcare-reform, when
buying insurance on the individual market was poor choice for all
but the youngest and healthiest.
But the absence of Expanded Medicaid diminishes some of the
benefits of the Exchange in non-Expansion states. Yet, perhaps as
these issues come to light, steps may be taken to solve or mitigate
some consequences of running an Exchange in a non-Expansion
state. What might be done is beyond the scope of this paper. But
here are some initial thoughts.
The obvious solution is to expand Medicaid. This may be a
political non-starter. Still, non-Expansion states may be willing to
adopt alternatives to covering those earning too little to qualify for
Exchange subsidies. States like Arkansas have adopted a “private
option,” using federal Medicaid dollars to purchase private
Exchange plans.
Having an affordable coverage option for individuals falling
below the poverty line alleviates many of the problems discussed.
It mitigates the consequences of mid-year income drops, and
avoids the dilemma of whether to notify the Exchange of an
income drop. It similarly would reduce an employer’s leverage over
vulnerable employees. It may also alleviate the consequences of
Churn if enrollees have access to the same coverage above and
below the poverty line. 111
As a more likely, but less efficacious option, new federal
111. Gabriel Ravel and I discuss two solutions to churn in our article
Crossing 138: Two Approaches to Churn Under the Affordable Care Act, 24
HEALTH MATRIX __ (forthcoming May 2014). The solutions involve providing
matching coverage in terms of benefits and provider network on both sides of
138% of the federal poverty line.
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regulation could mitigate some consequences. Much like Rule
1.36B-2 provides a safe harbor for enrollees who finish the year
earning less than the poverty line, a similar provision could create
a mid-year safe harbor. If an enrollee reports an income drop that
results in a projection that he will finish the year earning less
than the poverty line, the Exchange could treat that enrollee as an
eligible enrollee and offer subsidies according to the enrollee’s new
projected income. That new regulation would effectively apply
Rule 1.36B-2 mid-plan-year. It would also avoid the question of
whether to report a significant income decrease and the pay-now,
collect-later game.
Similarly, regulations and guidance could better acknowledge
the difficulty low-wage worker face in projecting future income.
When income turns on tips, unpredictable hours, or finding the
next odd-job, the presumption should be that the applicant will
earn at least the poverty level. Arguably, regulations already do
this, by requiring the Exchange to accept, without verification, an
applicant’s attestation of an income increase. But with the specter
of signing the application under the penalty of perjury, the
regulations and CCIIO guidance should make clear that lowincome workers can make every inference that their income will
exceed the poverty level.
An even less dramatic step, Exchanges in non-Expansion
states could exercises discretion to require enrollees to report only
material income increases, not decreases. 112 This could avoid some
mid-year subsidy redeterminations.
No doubt other options exist.
I believe that the Affordable Care Act help millions of
Americans. Hopefully, if the problems that arise in its
implementation are addressed seriously and swiftly, the most
vulnerable Americans will not fall through the cracks.

112. Contra Ken Jacobs, Dave Graham-Squire, Elise Gould & Dylan Roby,
Large Repayments of Premium Subsidies May Be Owed to the IRS if Family
Income Changes Are Not Promptly Reported, 32 Health Affairs no.9 (2013):
1538-1545 (“Prompt reporting of changes in income so that subsidy amounts
could be adjusted appropriately would help prevent financial shocks when
enrollees file their taxes. Prompt reporting would reduce the number of
subsidy recipients who owed repayments by 7–41 percent, depending on the
level of changes reported and the method used to adjust the subsidy amounts.
It could also reduce the size of median repayment obligations by as much as 61
percent.”)

